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SYMPOSIUM 
 
Onlookers Tell an Extraordinary 
Entity What to Do 
“RESTATEMENT OF…” SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION 
Anita Bernstein† 
INTRODUCTION 
Differing from most law review symposia, “Restatement 
Of . . . ” takes on more than a dozen fields of law—and butts into 
someone else’s work. It has the temerity to give advice to a private 
organization regarding the output it produces in furtherance of its 
mission.1 Nobody inside the organization sought this advice until 
I, acting at only my own behest,2 began e-mailing and phoning 
academic experts to invite their participation.3 The theses of the 
 
 † Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. My 
thanks to the institutions that funded and enhanced this Symposium: Brooklyn Law 
School, the Brooklyn Law Review, and the American Law Institute. Stephanie 
Middleton, Leslie Griffin, Ron Krotoszynski, Dana Brakman Reiser, Michael Cahill, 
and Lloyd Carew-Reid gave vital support to the project at an early stage—as did Lance 
Liebman, who also lent ALI expertise to our planning and aided in the production of 
this introduction. Thanks also to the Brooklyn Law Review editorial staff, especially 
John Moore and Annie Cataldo, and to the Symposium authors for bringing their big 
ideas to this collection. 
 1 A few other law review symposia that consider the prospect of new ALI 
restatements do exist. See, e.g., Covey T. Oliver, Foreword, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (1984) 
(assembling commentary about a new version of the RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW); Gene Shreve, Introduction to Symposium: Preparing for the Next 
Century—A New Restatement of Conflicts?, 75 IND. L.J. 399 (2000). This one breaks 
new ground in that it examines the restateability of multiple fields. 
 2 In 1995 I joined the American Law Institute and published an essay about 
its work, Anita Bernstein, Restatement Redux, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1663 (1995). I haven’t 
been especially active in the production of new restatements, and I invited participants 
to this Symposium before discussing the project with ALI personnel. 
 3 Their contributions follow in these pages. Three participants at the live 
event in January—Ellen Bublick, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Peter Strauss—were 
unfortunately unable to join the published version of this Symposium. 
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14 articles that follow present learned variations on “You 
might . . . ,” “You should . . . ,” “You shouldn’t . . . ,” “You can’t,” 
and even “You ought to consider restating something you might 
not have even thought was a field.” Chutzpah, I admit. 
The organization in question could well have said Who 
asked you?, but it instead has reacted with the utmost 
cooperation. As the afterword from outgoing director Lance 
Liebman makes clear, the American Law Institute welcomed 
what it could have written off as officious intermeddling.4 No 
ordinary nonprofit, this Institute. Yet at the risk of appearing 
ungrateful for the support that not only made this Symposium 
possible but also caused it to flourish, I argue here that external 
commentary like “Restatement Of . . . ” is entitled to a hearing by 
the ALI. Entitled, because this extraordinary entity has 
undertaken to listen. 
Throughout the near century of its existence, the ALI has 
been open to reassessing what it does, a stance that suggests 
stakeholders can—and I argue here should—opine on the 
possibility of both expansions and contractions in the 
Restatement agenda. Our authors were charged to consider the 
“restateability” of their fields of expertise and then recommend to 
the ALI and their fellow stakeholders whatever they saw fit. As 
gathered in this volume, their work product endorses new 
undertakings, new abstentions from established ALI projects, and 
particular responses to developments in varied corners of the law. 
Each of the thoughtful articles in this volume has a place 
in at least two groupings. The first grouping relates to the peer 
audience of specialists to whom it speaks. By the authority of its 
writer, each contribution joins the foundational scholarship of its 
field, conversing with interlocutors who know its author as a 
must-read authority. These varied literatures will thrive without 
“Restatement Of . . . ” as a uniter: I leave them here. 
The second grouping is this very issue of the Brooklyn Law 
Review which, in the aggregate and through each individual 
author, speaks to the American Law Institute, giving it advice 
about what to do. Participants in the Symposium have responded 
to a call; they join a dialogue that the American Law Institute has 
invited in its founding and through its work. 
 
 4 See Gerhard Dannemann, Is Unjust Enrichment Law an Officious Intermeddler?, 
92 B.U. L. REV. 991, 991 (2012) (describing the officious intermeddler as a “pest”). 
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I. THE CALL 
It would be irresponsible of me to assert that this 
Symposium responds to a tacit invitation from the American Law 
Institute without also explaining what I understand the terms of 
that offer to be. “You asked for it” can be an accurate assertion, but 
it has a worrisome provenance.5 The asserter ought to say who was 
asked, what was asked for, and what the asker owes in response. 
Let me dispatch the last point first: The ALI need do 
nothing in reaction to the ideas aired in the Symposium. However 
interesting and pertinent they may be, they are not entitled to be 
heeded. The first two points—who is invited to weigh in and what 
the ALI has invited—require more elaboration. 
A. Who Is Invited 
The ALI has overtly welcomed input from its 
membership. This group, capped at 3,000 persons (with life, ex 
officio, and honorary members of the Institute excluded), is 
“expected to take an active part in the Institute’s activities.”6 
Helping to guide the work of the Institute through the expression 
of opinions is close to obligatory; individuals may fulfill their 
membership obligation by alternative means, but their ideas 
about what to do form an important base of their participation. 
Most of the authors in this Symposium, as members of the ALI, 
are delivering on an expectation fixed before “Restatement 
Of . . . ” came together. 
The cohort of onlookers who may tell this extraordinary 
entity what to do extends beyond the membership roster. We 
can infer as much with reference to the Institute’s mission and 
operations. The ALI continually reexamines its membership 
procedures, ever attentive to the challenge of recruiting newer 
voices and perspectives.7 Lest anyone think that this practice is 
recent or even faddish, I note that Learned Hand himself, 
 
 5 Cf. The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers 
with “Failure to Protect”: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849 (2000).  
 6 Membership Overview, A.L.I., http://ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
membership.membership (last visited Oct. 15, 2013). 
 7 In a recent newsletter the Institute mused over the prospect of radically 
overhauling its recruitment of new members. Changes Coming to ALI Membership 
Process, A.L.I. REP. 3 (Spring/Summer 2013), available at http://www.ali.org/_news/
reporter/spring-summer-2013/spring-summer-2013.pdf. 
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writing about the future of the Institute in the middle of the 
twentieth century, shared in it.8 
Has anyone and everyone been invited to weigh in? Not 
quite. The ALI is for better or worse an elite entity, expecting 
participants in the dialogues it establishes to possess “the 
highest qualifications.”9 Over the years it has caused hosts of 
persons to feel excluded.10 It also unabashedly makes demands. 
Consistent with the ALI tradition of filtering, when I extended 
invitations to this Symposium I recalled how the Institute expects 
willingness to share in its mission, a criterion that though 
expansive is consistent with a filtering heritage. And so I asked 
the highly qualified invitees to generate new “scholarly work to 
clarify, modernize, and otherwise improve the law.”11 Scholars 
were not required to be members of the ALI to join “Restatement 
Of . . . ” and thereby make suggestions to the ALI about what it 
should do, but they were expected to share in an agenda of 
improvement. As you will see, they lived up to this expectation. 
There was another demand. In addition to possessing the 
highest qualifications and sharing in an agenda to clarify, 
modernize, and improve the law, persons entitled to tell the 
Institute what to do must also, in the ALI’s words, leave their 
clients at the door.12 By this phrase the Institute—along with me, 
 
 8 Writing about the Council, in effect the directors of the ALI as a 
corporation, Hand wrote: 
[W]e think that there should be an enlargement of its members, with a 
consequent infusion of fresh ideas and point of view. We recommend the 
addition of ten more members with the distinct understanding that they shall 
come from the forty to fifty age group rather than in the higher brackets 
where most of the present membership is. 
AM. LAW INST., REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON FUTURE PROGRAM 315 (submitted to 
the ALI Council, Mar. 18, 1947), [hereinafter HAND REPORT]. 
 9 ALI Overview, A.L.I., http://ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2013). 
 10 Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the 
Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205, 208-10 (2007) (cataloguing “criticisms [that] often 
center on the membership of the Institute, the scope and goals of Institute projects, the 
perception that the Restatements have not incorporated the knowledge of other 
disciplines . . . and the view that the Restatements represent antiquated Formalist 
thought that is not useful to modern lawyers”). 
 11 ALI Overview, supra note 9. 
 12 Quoting The ALI Reporter, one distinguished member of the Institute took 
that stance: 
To maintain the Institute’s reputation for thoughtful, disinterested analysis 
of legal issues, members are expected to leave client interests at the door. 
Members should speak and vote on the basis of their personal and 
professional convictions and experience without regard to client interests or 
self-interest. It is improper under Institute principles for a member to 
represent a client in Institute proceedings. If, in the consideration of Institute 
 
2014] INTRODUCTION: RESTATEMENT OF . . . 385 
in this Symposium—has said that advice for ALI action must 
originate in a disinterested motive to improve the law, with 
speakers expressing opinions for themselves rather than as 
anyone’s agents.13 
The articles published here are all written by full-time 
academics rather than client-focused partisans, and so this 
point about neutrality may seem tangential to these proceedings. 
But this Symposium is hardly the first occasion of onlookers 
telling this extraordinary entity what to do. As the ALI enters its 
next century, it will not be the last. Would-be advisers ought to 
know who has received the ALI call. It’s you, provided that you 
possess knowledge about the subject on which you opine and you 
have left any private or partisan agenda at the door. 
B. What Is Invited 
Here the ALI welcome grows wide and plenary. This 
breadth was in place from the start. Adopted on February 23, 
1923, the Institute’s corporate charter expresses a commitment 
to “the clarification and simplification of the law and its better 
adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of 
justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific 
legal work.”14 One of its leaders during this era, the contracts 
scholar Arthur Corbin, may have had authority to bind the ALI 
when he welcomed critical assessments of its work product: “The 
productions of the Institute should receive constant criticism, 
both destructive and constructive,” Corbin wrote a few years 
after the founding, “from within the membership of the 
Institute and from without.”15 
                                                                                                                                     
work, a member’s statements can be properly assessed only if the client 
interests of the member or the member’s firm are known, the member should 
make appropriate disclosure, but need not identify clients. 
Alex Elson, The Case for an In-Depth Study of the American Law Institute, 23 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 625, 636 (1998) (citation omitted). Compare Elizabeth Laposata et al., 
Tobacco Industry Influence on the American Law Institute’s Restatements of Torts and 
Implications for Its Conflict of Interest Policies, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2012), with Roberta 
Cooper Ramo & Lance Liebman, The ALI’s Response to the Center for Tobacco Control 
Research & Education, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 1 (2013) (debating the application of this 
conflict of interest policy). 
 13 For a worrisome articulation of this point, see Elson, supra note 12, at 634 
(“I have been told by several members of the [ALI] council that in recent years lobbying 
pressure upon them has been intense. What impact, if any, does such pressure have?”). 
 14 Certificate of Incorporation, A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
about.charter (last visited Oct. 15, 2013). 
 15 Arthur L. Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American 
Law Institute, 15 IOWA L. REV. 19, 29 (1929). 
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This broad platform has given ALI leaders the space to 
deliver a variety of responses to the needs of their time. 
Elsewhere I have argued that “clarification . . . of the law” back in 
the pre-computer scrivener founding era imposed mechanistic 
obligations on ALI volunteers.16 Today, with decisional law 
produced and stored in reliable electronic form, the work of 
clarification permits more debate and more choices. 
The roster of Restatements shows a policy of expansion. 
In its first round of work, completed in 1944, the ALI restated 
common law fields: agency, conflict of laws, contracts, judgments, 
property, restitution, security, torts, and trusts.17 The First 
Restatements of these doctrines created a new form for American 
law—neither code nor treatise nor monograph.18 Though divided 
from the start on the basic question of whether to summarize 
or change what judges had held in decisional law,19 each of 
these new documents was, in hindsight, skillfully crafted to 
gain influence in a conservative sector. Restatements leveraged 
the elite pedigrees of their writers to join the American legal 
establishment with little delay. 
The ALI could have rested on these laurels, reading its 
1923 charter to identify an agenda completed when Restatement 
(First) was done. It had clarified and simplified the law wherever 
American judges had disagreed about the substantive common 
law rights and entitlements of private litigants.20 Surely “better 
adaptation to social needs,” “the better administration of justice,” 
and “scholarly and scientific legal work” would emerge from 
this base of publications.21 Enough, no? 
No, said the Institute in 1947, in a remarkable report 
authored by Learned Hand as chairman of a seven-member 
Special Committee on Future Programs. With its Restatements 
published and gaining strength, the ALI formed this committee in 
1946 to consider what was next for the organization. Hand began 
the report by quoting himself: “There must be, in the words of the 
Chairman, several dishes simmering on the back of the stove so 
 
 16 Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1665 (citing N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and 
Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 55, 81 (1990)). 
 17 Jordan Steele, Univ. Pa., First Restatement of the Law Records, 
http://dla.library.upenn.edu/dla/ead/ead.pdf?id=EAD_upenn_biddle_USPULPULALI04
001 (last updated Apr. 28, 2011). 
 18 Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1668. 
 19 Id. at 1667. 
 20 Dan Tarlock, Why There Should Be No Restatement of Environmental Law, 
79 BROOK. L. REV 663, 665 (2014) (making this point about substance not procedure). 
 21 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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that when the presently used one is empty there is something 
to cook and serve for a next course.”22 The Hand Report 
endorsed many ideas for new projects: a variety of undertakings 
in business associations, a criminal law code, continued work in 
juvenile justice,23 a critical reexamination of common law rules as 
found in different fields, an income tax code (on which more anon 
from Lawrence Zelenak),24 possible contributions to a United 
Nations-sponsored code of international law, recommendations 
for the reform of patent law, more restating of property (more 
anon on that one too),25 and attention to continuing legal 
education. Curiously, the one prospect that Hand and his 
colleagues abjured was new Restatements. This hesitation 
aside, the ALI announced an ever-onward initiative in 1947, a 
stance to which it adheres. 
ALI director Lance Liebman, in his afterword to this 
Symposium, touches on a few highlights of the twenty-first 
century Institute, of which a move into the transnational has 
been especially noteworthy.26 Liebman observes that the ALI has 
never defined the term restatement.27 Like him, I read this 
omission of a definition as inviting multiple views of what might 
be restated. The diverse contributions to this Symposium do not 
begin to exhaust what could be on the Restatement horizon. 
One caveat on the question of what is invited: In my 
opinion, the Institute’s attention to “improvement”28 implicitly 
 
 22 HAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 299. Hand’s comparison of ALI work to what 
simmers on a kitchen stove is welcome to this reader. See Anita Bernstein, Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: General Principles and the Prescription of Masculine Order, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 1367, 1392 n.122 (2001) (praising what a journalist called an “analogy overhaul” away 
from “retreats and victories, blows delivered and knockouts scored, bulls’-eyes, pilings on, 
Hail-Mary passes and hat tricks,” and proposing “few fewer penalty boxes and fumbles, 
saturation bombings, shots across the bow and hits below the belt—wouldn’t this be a 
pleasure for everyone?”(quoting Geneva Overholser, Rise of Women Could Change Sound of 
Power, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 27, 2000, at A11)). 
 23 Susan Frelich Appleton’s contribution to this Symposium may be read as 
responsive to this suggestion. Susan Frelich Appleton, Restating Childhood, 79 BROOK. 
L. REV. 525 (2014). 
 24 Lawrence Zelenak, The Almost-Restatement of Income Tax of 1954: When 
Tax Giants Roamed the Earth, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 709 (2014). 
 25 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Why Restate the Bundle? The 
Disintegration of the Restatement of Property, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 681 (2014). 
 26 Lance Liebman, Law Reform Agenda as ALI Approaches Its Centennial: 
“Restatement Of…” Symposium Conclusion, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 821, 821-23 (2014). 
 27 Id. at 822. Even the most basic points are open. V. William Scarpato, “Is” v. 
“Ought,” or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Restatement, 85 TEMP. L. 
REV. 413, 447 n.331 (2013) (assembling citations on the perennial question of whether 
ALI restatements ought to say what the law is or what it should be). 
 28 See Part I: Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent 
Organization for the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an 
American Law Institute, 1 A.L.I. PROC. 1, 2 (1923). 
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states a demand that those who respond to its call engage with 
American legal institutions. Theory and ideology may pervade the 
responses that onlookers make, but in the end those who speak to 
the ALI must include action items, something concrete to do.29 A 
focus on usefulness is likely part of why we law professors seek to 
join the organization and look for a project when we sign up. We 
who publish law review articles have other venues for our less 
purposeful work. The Institute, aware that sometimes we want 
to make a difference in the world, invites us to bring analyses 
and inquiry to discrete projects that we can propose. 
II. THE RESPONSE 
In response to the American Law Institute call, scholars in 
this Symposium have written what might be termed position 
papers that take an array of normative stances. This Part groups 
them into five categories. 
A. Widening the List of Topics 
This first cohort of writers chose to name areas of law 
that arguably qualify for new Restatements of their own. 
Readers who expect this section of the Symposium to feature 
self-interested special pleading—Pick me and mine! We deserve 
more attention!—are in for a happy surprise. Scholars whose 
work appears here make detailed, citation-filled, substantive 
cases for the inclusion of three fields. 
Leading off is Marci Hamilton, noted for both 
scholarship and advocacy in a number of domains including her 
focus in recent years on redress for, and prevention of, the sexual 
abuse of children. In The Time Has Come for a Restatement of 
Child Sex Abuse,30 Hamilton announces an imperative for an 
emerging field. Like most of what the ALI undertakes to restate, 
the doctrinal source material that Hamilton studies is covered 
largely in common law, but Hamilton also canvasses statutes on 
point, such as state-level mandatory reporting laws and crimes 
codified in Title 18 of the United States Code, before moving to 
rules of evidence and the First Amendment. Like the ALI’s 
 
 29 See, e.g., A.L.I., Annual Report 2012–2103 at 19 (announcing the Young 
Scholars Medal, a biennial ALI prize for “early-career law professors whose work is 
relevant to the real world”). I may be wrong on this point about concreteness but, as 
one of our contributors notes, I have stated it insistently. Mae Kuykendall, Restatement 
of Place, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 757, 761 (2014). 
 30 Marci A. Hamilton, The Time Has Come for a Restatement of Child Sex 
Abuse, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 397 (2014). 
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Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, which makes 
reference to the law of agency, torts, contracts, and evidence, 
Hamilton’s Restatement of Child Sex Abuse would bring together 
a variety of doctrinal inputs in a pertinent new context.31 
Similar to Hamilton in this respect, David Orentlicher 
partakes of a range of sources in advocating for A Restatement of 
Health Care Law.32 Unique biographical credentials inform this 
work: as a medical doctor and former state legislator as well as a 
legal scholar, Orentlicher speaks with authority about treatment 
decisions, informed consent, and state-based insurance regulation. 
Also like Hamilton, Orentlicher includes constitutional doctrines 
and federal statutory law in the restatement mix for which he 
advocates. For any reader who might think that health care law is 
too eclectic to restate, Orentlicher has a pertinent rejoinder: Courts 
already treat it as a field unto itself. What Orentlicher calls “health 
care exceptionalism” has generated a panoply of judicial 
prohibitions, exceptions, immunities, and other ad hoc responses 
that fit together poorly.33 A health care Restatement would give 
reformers a chance to examine a jumble, learning “the ways in 
which health care is both different from, and similar to, other 
sectors of the economy.”34 
The last paper of this section continues the theme of 
expansion. Copyright scholar Ann Bartow proposes a 
Restatement of her field of expertise, an area dominated by one 
federal statute, the Copyright Act.35 One might have thought that 
the traditional Restatement attention to state rather than federal 
law and common law rather than statutes would disqualify 
copyright from restateability. But as other contributions to this 
Symposium observe, federal statutory law has long lain in the 
sights of restaters,36 and as Bartow shows, copyright is plenty 
“complicated,”37 disputed, and refashioned in the courts. 
Moreover, as Bartow argues, the place that Restatement of 
Copyright could occupy is now held by a for-profit treatise 
manifesting influences that, as we have seen above, the American 
 
 31 See Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, A.L.I., 
http://www.ali.org/ali_old/a252.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (noting that “the special 
context of lawyering” unites “traditional areas”). 
 32 David Orentlicher, A Restatement of Health Care Law, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 
435 (2014). 
 33 Id. at 447-48 
 34 Id. at 448. 
 35 Ann Bartow, A Restatement of Copyright Law as More Independent and 
Stable Treatise, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 457 (2014). 
 36 See Dan Tarlock, Why There Should Be No Restatement of Environmental 
Law, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 663 (2014); Zelenak, supra note 24, at 709. 
 37 Bartow, supra note 35, at 457. 
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Law Institute eschews.38 A Restatement of Copyright Law as More 
Independent and Stable Treatise states a claim for the ALI that is 
consistent with, but also expansive of, the Institute’s mission. 
B. Projects Underway 
Writers in this group elaborate on fields of law that the 
ALI has already undertaken to restate. In different ways, their 
three articles explore what it means to restate a new field of law: 
the first of them provides an alternative perspective on a 
Principles-in-progress led by two other scholars, while the other 
two reflect on the priorities and concerns they brought to the ALI 
in advocating for the restateability of the field they know well. 
In the first of these contributions, Ronald Krotoszynski, 
Jr. complements the anticipated Principles of Privacy now under 
construction by co-reporters Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove.39 
As Krotoszynski notes, the ALI version of a privacy restatement 
focuses on data protection, a narrower understanding of privacy 
than the one Krotoszynski has advanced in numerous 
monographs and law review articles,40 and yet even the 
Schwartz and Solove project “faces serious difficulties.”41 The 
wide reach of this issue in American law might commend the 
application of a “pervasive method”42 to the problem of privacy, 
wherein the ALI would answer questions piecemeal as they 
arise in separate Restatements. But to Krotoszynski this reaction 
amounts to denial that will not succeed; the concept has settled 
into our national consciousness. “If we cannot slay the privacy 
hydra, then we must learn to live with the privacy hydra.”43 A 
Prolegomenon to Any Future Restatement of Privacy thus presents 
the subject in full breadth, including an observation that the ALI 
has led American law reform on the subject of privacy at least 
 
 38 See supra Part I.A. See generally Bartow, supra note 35. 
 39 Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., A Prolegomenon to Any Future Restatement of 
Privacy, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 505 (2014). 
 40 See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., PRIVACY REVISITED: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE “RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE” (forthcoming 2014); Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 IND. L.J. 881, 882 (2013) (expounding on 
what the word means); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the 
First Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a 
Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1549 (2004) (endorsing a 
comparative approach). 
 41 Krotoszynski, supra note 39, at 507. 
 42 See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
31, 32 (1992) (announcing a new pedagogy). 
 43 Krotoszynski, supra note 39, at 509. 
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since 1955, when the Model Penal Code boldly proposed to stay 
out of consenting adults’ sex lives.44 
The other two projects underway are described by ALI 
participants who speak for themselves, but also advert to 
restatement plans they have advanced inside the Institute. 
In the first of these two articles, Susan Frelich Appleton 
expounds on Restating Childhood.45 American law regulates and 
controls childhood, Appleton explains, yet “even beyond 
predictable divergences in the conclusions reached or balances 
struck across the range of legal contexts, the underlying 
premises about children that yield these responses lack 
consistency.”46 Appleton is inspired by two past ALI works: the 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, for its prescient 
embrace of emerging insights, and the Model Penal Code, for 
reformist ambitions that resemble what the law of children 
needs. As a member of the ALI Council as well as a prominent 
scholar of family law, Appleton is ideally positioned to guide 
the Institute through the task of restating childhood; her 
article is as authoritative on family-law substance as it is on 
ALI procedure. 
The second project underway in the ALI, on election 
law, occupies comparable breadth. Steven Huefner and Edward 
Foley observe that election law is “the ‘meta-law’ of 
representative democracy.”47 Much depends on its rules and 
processes, heavily revised and expanded at both the state and 
federal level in the 14 years since Bush v. Gore. These rules 
and processes tangle the kind of attention the ALI could give 
them—and yet, as Huefner and Foley suggest in their title, 
reconciliation and reform are hard to achieve in a field of law so 
dominated by politics. Focused (as am I) on achieving results 
on the ground, Huefner and Foley find two areas of election law 
especially ready for their efforts: principles for resolving 
disputed elections, and analyses of how to vote when one is 
away from one’s geographic precinct.48 These specifics give 
their Principles of Election Law a base from which Huefner and 
Foley can consider the jurisprudence of neutrality, 
partisanship, and federalism. 
 
 44 Id. at 505. 
 45 Appleton, supra note 23, at 527. 
 46 Id.  
 47 Steven F. Huefner & Edward B. Foley, The Judicialization of Politics: The 
Challenge of the ALI Principles of Election Law Project, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 551, 553 (2014). 
 48 Id. at 558-60. 
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C. Restatements between the Lines 
This third group of responses to the call takes a 
different approach from the earlier two. Instead of advocating 
for a new ALI-sponsored text in their field of expertise, they 
consider where and whether this subject is found in existing 
Restatements. They find Restatements between the lines. 
Religion scholar Ian Bartrum opens this group of 
contributions by asking and answering the question of how the 
ALI can helpfully engage with religion in American law.49 
Bartrum starts by noting the prominence of religion in the 
contemporary United States. For this purpose he reads religion 
as religious liberty: a “constitutional bedrock,” he says, around 
which “the common law river sweeps.”50 Bartrum locates 
religious liberty in existing doctrinal Restatements, identifies 
potential conflicts within these instances, and commends to the 
ALI a short list of religious-liberty themes and issues to 
examine in future work. 
Whereas Bartrum works in the “micro” particulars of 
Restatement blackletter, the lawyer-economist Keith Hylton 
considers restating as a macro-activity engaged in by a reporter 
appointed by the ALI, comparable to common law lawmaking.51 
Every Restatement, Hylton suggests, manifests the incentives 
and goals of the individual whom the ALI vests with the power 
to draft the document. The Economics of the Restatement and of 
the Common Law is the only one of these 14 articles that 
conceives of restating as the output of one person who labors 
alone. Hylton qualifies this generalization: “of course, the ALI 
has to approve the Reporter’s work, which constrains the 
Reporter’s freedom.”52 Yet these checks, Hylton argues, do not 
shelter Restatements from the impulse to publish what their 
drafters want to say, and so they come to contain eccentric 
blackletter inconsistent with the better-checked common law.53 
Surveying examples from the various Restatements of Torts, 
Hylton educes a meta-restatement of law and economics, a 
record of how individuals satisfied their preferences at the 
expense of doctrinal correctness. 
 
 49 Ian Bartrum, Religion and the Restatements, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 579 (2014). 
 50 Id. at 580. 
 51 Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of the Restatement and of the Common 
Law, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 595 (2014). 
 52 Id. at 603. 
 53 Id. at 603-04. 
2014] INTRODUCTION: RESTATEMENT OF . . . 393 
A third way to talk about Restatements between the 
lines is to contrast a hypothetical freestanding new text, 
advocated above under “A Wider List of Topics” and “Projects 
Underway,” with an interstitial take on restating. In The 
Restatement of Gay(?),54 Courtney Joslin and Lawrence Levine 
weigh the relative merits of each approach and conclude that 
what LGBT law should receive from the ALI is the latter rather 
than the former. Joslin and Levine show that a separate volume 
about the law pertaining to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender persons risks marginalizing and isolating topics 
that matter to this vibrant minority. Instead, they argue, the 
ALI ought to choose “LGBT incorporation.”55 Building on their 
expertise in family law and torts respectively, Joslin and Levine 
give examples of where existing ALI Restatements could 
modernize American law through expanded LGBT attention. 
D. Unrestateable? 
Contributions in this group answer the ALI call with a 
response that the field would be challenging, at a minimum, to 
restate. Their answer is not an unequivocal No. Instead, they 
describe complications that might arise from such attempts to 
restate the law governing their areas of expertise. 
This cohort of articles starts with Why There Should Be 
No Restatement of Environmental Law by A. Dan Tarlock who, 
before the live event, proffered the useful adjective 
“unrestateable” to describe a domain of law that he has helped 
to form.56 Writing partly in reaction to the recent suggestion 
that the ALI consider studying two subfields of environmental 
law,57 Tarlock concludes that “environmental law needs to be 
reimagined not restated.” He makes a graceful case against a 
new Restatement. Acknowledging that the brushoff “Romans 
didn’t recognize the subject” no longer can toss a Restatement 
project from the contemporary ALI agenda,58 Tarlock moves to 
what really precludes this new document: Environmental law, 
he explains, is positive law—not common law, where restating 
fares best. Legislators had to promulgate it because common law 
 
 54 Courtney G. Joslin & Lawrence C. Levine, The Restatement of Gay(?), 79 
BROOK. L. REV. 621 (2014). 
 55 Id. at 630. 
 56 Tarlock, supra note 36, at 663. 
 57 The subfields are environmental impact analysis and environmental 
enforcement. See id. 
 58 See id. at 664-66. 
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antecedents like nuisance do not adequately impede the human 
tendency to “use . . . air, soil and water as waste sinks.”59 
Moreover, as Tarlock shows, environmental law does not contain 
enough substantive general-application content to restate. 
A related yet distinct difficulty vexes the Restatement of 
Property, a compendium that the ALI has been working on 
continually for 75 years. If property, like Tarlock’s environmental 
law, is unrestateable, then 17 published volumes that purport to 
restate the law of property call for an explanation. Our 
Symposium contains a definitive account from the persons best 
qualified to explain this failure, Thomas Merrill and Henry 
Smith. Restatements (First), (Second), and (Third) of Property, 
according to Merrill and Smith, have had little influence on the 
courts, manifest several contradictions,60 and are silent on 
fundamentals like adverse possession, real estate transfers, 
recording acts, groundwater and mineral rights, eminent 
domain, and intellectual property. Seeking to explain this 
failure, Merrill and Smith travel back to the First Restatement, 
where they find powerful influence in the works of Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld. Property to Hohfeld was “bundle of rights,” 
or, in Merrill and Smith’s paraphrase, “an ever-mutating 
institution” that denies an internal architecture and thus 
cannot be restated. Hohfeld has been dead for almost a 
hundred years but his conception retains appeal among 
property scholars who disagree on other points.61 Why Restate 
the Bundle? The Disintegration of the Restatement of Property 
tells the ALI that it can have the bundle or a Restatement but 
it can’t have both. 
A more affectionate history in this “Unrestateable” corner 
of our Symposium details the work of the ALI on federal income 
tax, which Lawrence Zelenak says was prepared “when tax giants 
roamed the earth.”62 Zelenak, a tax giant himself, argues that we 
have no Restatement of the Law of Federal Income Taxation not 
because the project is too ambitious, but because the challenge of 
preparing it, at least as envisioned by the ALI in 1948, “was not 
ambitious enough.”63 In 1954 the ALI published not a 
Restatement but a draft federal income tax statute. Consistent 
 
 59 Id. at 667. 
 60 Merrill & Smith, supra note 25 at 681 (“[S]ignificant portions of the third 
Restatement consist of repudiating what was done in the first and second 
Restatements, which can hardly inspire confidence.” (footnote omitted)). 
 61 Id. at 696-98. 
 62 Zelenak, supra note 24, at 709. 
 63 Id. 
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with what Learned Hand and his special committee had 
advocated, this two-volume document did not try to set tax rates;64 
it also stayed out of tax procedure and specialized provisions.65 
But it covered almost everything that Congress could want for its 
revision of the old 1939 Internal Revenue Code. When the 1954 
Code came out, it showed the handiwork of the ALI “giants.” One 
ALI idea that did not appear in the 1954 Code, non-recognition of 
gain and loss for property transferred in connection with divorce, 
was simply ahead of its time; it became federal law three decades 
later.66 Current federal income tax law is now too complex for the 
ALI to restate, Zelenak concludes, but discrete smaller projects 
remain available for its intervention. 
The last article in this cluster returns to the “Why 
There Should Be No Restatement” theme with which it began, 
but with a different slant on rejection. Statutory interpretation 
scholar Lawrence Solan urges the ALI to eschew restating 
statutory interpretation out of a concern broached above by 
Huefner and Foley: politics.67 Recall that Huefner and Foley 
spoke about “the judicialization of politics” as a background 
condition behind restating election law;68 to moderate this fact 
on the ground, they have started to look for relatively neutral 
principles in a partisan realm. Solan worries that a 
Restatement of statutory interpretation would have all the 
politics but not enough of the candor that makes an ALI 
Principles of Election Law so promising to Huefner and Foley. 
Identifying another difficulty, Solan, who holds a doctorate in 
linguistics, notes the futility of trying to apply “ordinary 
meaning” as a rubric to know what words in a statute mean.69 
In order to be restateable, Solan concludes, a field needs its 
share of easy cases; but statutory interpretation, for better or 
worse, remains “largely about hard cases.”70 
E. Coda 
At the end of this volume Mae Kuykendall, known 
primarily for her work on corporate governance but also a 
pioneering scholar in other fields, proposes a new Restatement 
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of Place.71 Because this article advocates inclusion of a new 
field in the Restatement gallery, it has a good potential home 
in the first part of this book. Yet the meditative, almost elegiac, 
approach to restating that Kuykendall takes also brackets the 
entire Symposium. 
Suggesting that the ALI prepare a Restatement of Place, 
Kuykendall sets out “to provide demonstrative examples of the 
presence of place in the construction of law; to suggest how a 
rigorous analysis of its presence across dimensions of law might 
proceed; and to suggest the manner in which principles might be 
shaped to guide law-making or the application of common law.”72 
Restatement of Place defines place, distinguishes it from space 
and territory, and finds it ubiquitous as a legal classification. 
Place is restateable not as a “set of standard doctrines affecting 
an activity,” Kuykendall argues, but “the unstated premise of 
much of law. Places organize the operative parts of a legal 
question; locutions take forms of place metaphor, or they overtly 
use measurements of space, to define duties and rights.”73 
The Symposium thus begins and ends with a theme 
present both in the ALI’s call and the contributors’ response: the 
imperative to widen. Its final article urges the Institute to 
undertake a restatement of one subject for the sake of obtaining 
“a deeper account” of how it fits within “legal reasoning, the 
assignment of rights, and the understanding of facts.”74 The 
other articles published here—along with the ALI itself, from 
its founding era through this moment—pursue the same goal. 
 
 71 Kuykendall, supra note 29, at 757. 
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